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Abstract 
 
We assess the effects of terrorism on capital flight in a panel of 29 African countries for 
which data is available for the period 1987-2008. The terrorism dynamics entail domestic, 
transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations and Quantile regressions 
(QR). The following findings are established. First, for GMM, domestic, transnational, 
unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase capital flight. Second, for QR, with the 
exception of transnational terrorism for which a positive effect on capital flight is apparent in 
the 0.90
th
 quintile, terrorism dynamics affect capital flight in low quintiles of the capital flight 
distribution. In other words, terrorism increases capital flight for the most part when initial 
levels of capital flight are low. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The November 2015 Radison Blu Hotel attack in Mali and Sinai Russian plane crash 
in Egypt clearly show that the threat of terrorism is posing a development challenge to Africa. 
Other notable examples include: (i) the 2015 Garissa University and 2013 Westgate shopping 
mall killings in Kenya by the Somali Al-Shabab; (ii) wave of attacks from Islamic 
fundamentalists targeting the Bardo National Museum and Sousse respectively in March and 
June 2015 and (iii) Boko Haram of Nigeria extending its sphere of terrorism to neighbouring 
countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger.  
Terrorism
1
 is the new face of violence with economic consequences. In the context of 
a paradoxical African setting, where countries in this region are in need of scarce economic 
resources to foster their development process, and also record almost the highest volume of 
global capital flight among developing countries, we take interest in understanding its linkage 
to terrorism. As a foundational definition; capital flight is the outflow of economic resources 
from respective countries (Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015; Asongu, 2014a). It includes 
the outflow of short-term capital as a response to some factors that are peculiar with the 
respective country, and which may affect the economic value of such capital. Precisely, there 
has been a rising trend in the volume of capital flight from African countries. Cumulatively, 
the volume of capital flight has remained higher than the foreign direct investment flow and 
the official development assistance (see Figure 1), which are the main sources of external 
financing for Africa’s development trajectory.  
 
Figure 1: Capital Flight in Comparison with other External Financial Flow 
 
Note: The values are in Billion US$ 
                                                          
1
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the 
purpose of employing intimation to meet political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006). 
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Source: Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a) 
 
In this paper, we considered the rising rate of terrorism in some African countries and 
to what extent this trend explains capital flight from Africa. The scatter plot in Figure 2 
provides a non-technical hint on the possibility of the explanatory power of terrorism on 
capital movement from Africa. As a hint, an increase in terrorism activities perpetrated by 
indigenes of a country (domestic terrorism) and those by foreigners (transnational terrorism) 
will result in a positive slope of capital flight. Thus, implying that there will likely be a 
positive effect of terrorism on capital flight in Africa, ceteris paribus. However, these 
predictions will require empirical validation for credence.  
 
Figure 2: Cross Country Correlation between Terrorism and Capital Flight, Average 
 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
Concisely, we ask two important questions: first, how does the rising rate of terrorism 
in Africa affect capital flight? Second, how different is this magnitude when comparing 
terrorism initiated by the nationals of the respective countries (domestic terrorism) and those 
initiated across borders or by nationals of other countries (transnational terrorism)?The 
answer to the first question has important implications to provide relevant empirical evidence 
on the cost of the rising terrorism in resource starved Africa. Most importantly, by providing 
relevant statistics on the magnitude of influence of terrorism on capital flight, the reality of 
the cost of terrorism can be better seen and may spur policy actions. Most countries in Africa 
are taking steps towards attracting and retaining capital, although part of the effort is to 
improve security and reduce the risk of investment within the country, however, a new 
generation of policy may be motivated if the economic value (in terms of capital flight) of a 
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terrorist action is clearly known. The answer to the second question may suggest the relative 
impact of the two forms of terrorism, and afterwards the direction of policy efforts can be 
exploited towards tackling the one with higher economic impact. This is important 
considering that there is a rising campaign for development partners to increase aid flow to 
African countries (as well as other development countries) in order to augment the resources 
needed for counter-terrorism efforts (see Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014; Efobi et al, 2015; 
Asongu et al, 2015).  
Empirical studies on the drivers of capital flight can be broadly categorised into two 
groups: the domestic and external determinants. The domestic drivers include those 
conditions that are prevalent within the country, which explains the reasons for capital flight. 
They include the structural features of the economy (in terms of the country being natural 
resource dependence or otherwise), macroeconomic environment (e.g. economic growth and 
inflation), risk and returns on investment (e.g. currency depreciation, financial instability, 
domestic tax rate), the governance structure of the country (such as corruption),and other 
forms of political factors. Focusing on the political factors, authors have identified the 
political environment of countries as having a significant influence on capital flight (Collier 
et al., 2004; Davies,2008; Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015). Political instability such as 
war or civil unrest raises the insurance premium on investment, as well as the risk of loss or 
damages to assets. This causes investment capitals to be taken out of the country to countries 
where the risks of losing such investment are lower. On the other hand, the external 
determinant of capital flight is the rising global integration among countries, which makes it 
easy for capital flight between (or among) countries. More so, it has been documented that 
foreign financial institutions encourage capital flight by having lax regulations with regards 
to movement of corrupt and embezzled fund and not having checks on fund lodged into their 
financial systems (Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015). 
Terrorism involves the use of violence by individuals or groups against non-
combatants in order to foster political or social objectives, and with the intimidation of a 
larger audience beyond the immediate victims (Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014). Unlike political 
instability, terrorists are involved in pressuring besieged government to concede to their 
demands by targeting civilians. Since the occurrences of terrorist actions are non-
deterministic and may not be accurately predicted; hence, it raises the risk and cost of 
retaining capital in the venue country. In most cases, terrorist target central economic 
locations; with poor anti-terrorism efforts by the government, target countries will witness an 
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increasing outflow of capital due to heightened uncertainties/capital security. On this note, it 
is important to also consider the distinct impact of the two main forms of terrorism (i.e. 
domestic and transnational). This is because there are rising incidences of African countries 
experiencing spill-over from terrorist activities in neighbouring countries. The Somali’s Al-
Shabaab activities in Kenya and some other East African countries; and the Nigeria’s Boko 
Haram group perpetrating violence in neighbouring country Cameroon, Niger and Chad, are 
cases in point.  
The contrasting effects of domestic and transnational terrorism have spurred research 
interest that is targeted at understanding its impact on capital movement. The earliest work to 
carry on this enquiry, especially for developing countries, are Bandyopadhyay and Younas 
(2014), and Bandyopadhyay et al, (2014, 2015). The authors studied the effect of both 
domestic and transnational terrorism on movement of foreign investments; they found similar 
negative impact but at different magnitudes. In the spirit of the debate, we provide empirical 
work on the linkage between terrorism (and its components) and capital flight using an 
isolated sample of 29 African countries. This sample is unique because of the controversial 
regimes of capital outflow it records. Interested readers can see Ndikumana, Boyce and 
Ndiaye (2015) for a more detailed statistics of the trend of capital flight from Africa. 
However, we make attempt to highlight some: as at the period 1970-90, capital flight from 
Africa was about 40 percent of the entire private wealth, which was about four times that of 
Latin America despite the higher private capital per worker of the later (collier et al, 2001). 
Also, in 2010, unrecorded capital flight from Africa represents 39.5 percent of GDP, 
compared to 12 percent in the East and South Asia (Henry, 2012). The implication of this 
statistics are: first, the region faces a lot of capital constraint compared to other regions and a 
capital flight of this magnitude will imply that the available resources required for 
development will be further depleted. No wonder the huge resource gap recorded in the 
region (see Asiedu, 2006). Second, as a result of this impoverishment, the damaging effect on 
human development structures will be further visible as funds needed for social services such 
as education and health care, among others, will be lacking (see Ndikumana and Boyce, 
2011a). As a result of these, urgent attention is needed to understand other possible and 
emerging causes of capital flight as a further step towards resolving it. 
This paper is connected to the literature on the determinants of capital flight on one 
hand, and the economic consequences of the rising rate of global terrorism, on the other hand. 
The first strand of literature have not considered the dynamic influence of terrorism on capital 
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flight. The second strand of literature is becoming popular following the rising trend of 
terrorist attacks around the world. More importantly, attention is being drawn to understand 
the consequences as this will help to shape global policy on acts of terrorism. The 
contributors to this literature, and their focus has being: terrorism and its consequences on 
foreign investment (Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2014; Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014, 2015; 
Asongu et al, 2015; Efobi et al, 2015); terrorism and the labour force (Berrebi and Ostwald, 
2014a); terrorism and economic development (Piazza, 2006); terrorism and the productivity 
of certain sectors in the country (Berrebi and Klor, 2010; Berrebi and Ostwald, 2013); 
terrorism and fertility rate (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2014b).  
This study is the first to relate these two strands of literature by using a sample from 
the African region for the period 1987 to 2008 as well as a variety of macroeconomic 
controls. While there is a substantial bulk of the empirical literature on the nexus between 
capital flight and violence (Nyatepe-Coo, 1994; Hermes and Lensink, 2001; Lensink et al., 
2000; Fielding, 2004; Le and Zak, 2006), the dimension of terrorism has hitherto not been 
investigated. Terrorism is likely to affect capital flight because it creates an uncertain 
economic outlook and investors have been documented to prefer investing in less ambiguous 
economic environments (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab). In essence, the phenomenon of 
terrorism is of significant economic consequence, such that investors could be concerned 
about the valuation of their assets and may lose confidence in the positive economic outlook. 
Hence, money and assets may rapidly flow out of a country as a result of terrorism.  
We implement a robust panel analysis to understand the effects of terrorism on capital 
flight as well as observe the dynamic implications across the different origins of terrorism 
(i.e. transnational, domestic). We find that terrorism as a whole causes an increase in capital 
flight in Africa. However, when considering the disaggregated terrorism data, domestic 
terrorism significantly causes capital flight unlike transnational terrorism. Even unclear 
terrorism was also found to have a significant impact on capital flight. The effect of the 
different forms of terrorism on capital flight (considering varying quantiles) was further 
computed. This is such that the effect is considered at different intensities of terrorism. The 
result suggest that at 75 percent quantile, both domestic and transnational significantly 
explains the extent of capital flight from African countries. As for the unclear terrorism and 
total terrorism, the impact on capital flight was significant across the levels of percentiles 
apart from 25 and 90 percent quantiles (unclear terrorism), and 10 percent quantile for total 
terrorism.  
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The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. A literature review is covered in the 
second section. The third section lays out the empirical model, describes the variables and 
discusses the data. The estimation results are presented and discussed in the fourth section, 
while the fifth section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we present the reasoning from the literature that shows how the rising 
wave of terrorism will further impact on the incidences of capital flights. Using civil war as a 
measure of violence, Collier (1999) predicts that the capital stock of countries tend to reduce 
as a result of incidences of civil war. Conflict increases the rate of uncertainty with respect to 
the future returns on assets held within the country. As a result of this, domestic investors 
relocate their capital abroad. Some studies that support this proposition include Le and Zak 
(2001), Ndikumana and Boyce (2002), and Davies (2010).  
It is important to discuss how terrorism differs from other forms of violence like war, 
domestic conflicts and instabilities. Terrorism and other forms of violence are similar in 
terms of their resultant effects. Which are mostly loss of life and property. However, a clear 
distinction between them can be seen in their targets. For terrorism, the targets are often non-
combatant individuals (see Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2014), who may be 
unaware of the ideologies or the objectives of the terrorists. Terrorists aim at non-combatants 
in order to raise their anxiety levels so that they pressure their government to grant the 
terrorist’s demands (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2010). This explains the reasons for a unified 
global effort targeted against terrorist activities: its effect adversely impacts innocent non-
combatants. On the other-hand, the targets of other forms of violence are mostly combatants 
or government forces, and to a large extent, the violence is spurred by one party being 
disgruntled or having a deep feeling of being cheated (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; 
Sharma, 2006; Sandlers and Emders, 2008; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 
2011).  
Terrorism can be categorised into two main groups: domestic and transnational 
terrorism. Domestic terrorism is home grown and home directed and the perpetrators, 
victims, and audience are from the venue country. This is unlike transnational terrorism with 
perpetrators, supporters, victims, and audience involving two or more countries 
(Bandyopahyay, Sandler and Younas, 2011; Napps and Enders, 2015). There are varying 
impact of these two forms of terrorism on the domestic capital stocks of countries. 
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) examines this effect on the income per capita of African 
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countries for the period 1970-2007. For the entire sample, they found transnational terrorism 
as having a significant impact on income per capita: the absence of domestic terrorism impact 
was also observed.One identified reason for the differences in the impact of the two forms of 
terrorism is that transnational terrorism creates graver impact as it creates fear in foreigners, 
foreign businesses (including personnel and assets), as well as international institutions. This 
will have a significant effect on capital retention in the country (Sandler and Enders, 2008).  
Banyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014) is another closely related study, but with 
emphasis on a broader sample of 72 developing countries, and focusing on counterterrorism 
effect of foreign aid. The authors found the both types of terrorism having a depressing effect 
on foreign investment. Their intuition is: terrorist activities tend to increase the premium on 
retaining investment in the venue country, and heightens the risk capital and output losses, 
and other overhead cost like security. As a result of this, investment capital tends to be 
repatriated from countries that are prone to terrorist activities. As a comment on the issue of 
violence and capital repatriation, Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye (2015) supports this finding 
but with a focus on other violent activities apart from terrorism.  
We expect a positive relationship between terrorism and capital flight, however when 
considering the components of terrorism (i.e. domestic and transnational terrorism), we will 
rely on some theoretical explanations. For instance, transnational terrorism targets foreign 
citizens, foreign businesses and international institutions that are operational within the 
country, therefore it is expected that its impact will stimulate more capital repatriation from 
the affected country compared to domestic terrorism. The studies (i.e. Sandler and Enders, 
2008; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011) that reached this conclusion was focusing on a different 
form of capital – foreign investment – unlike the interest of this study. The mechanism is 
that: since terrorism affect the economic value of capital, capital owners will tend to 
substitute the location of their capital from the respective country to another location abroad 
(see Collier, 1999).  
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data  
The terrorism data are from Efobi et al. (2015) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014).The 
motivation for using this dataset for the measure of terrorism is its ability to separate 
terrorism data across the two main classifications (i.e. domestic and transnational terrorism). 
More so, the dataset contains data for unclear (those forms of terrorism which are neither 
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domestic nor transnational) and total terrorism. Hence, the study uses four distinct but related 
independent variables 
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Terrorism is measured as the number of terrorist incidents 
registered by a given country yearly. In order to limit issues related to positive skew and log 
transformation of zeros, the data is improved by adding one to the base before taking natural 
logarithms of the terrorism incidents. Cho and Salehyan (2013) and Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2014) have recently adopted the same transformation procedure.  
Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism 
“includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals of the venue country: 
implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue 
country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that 
concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence 
may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”.  Unclear terrorism is 
that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor 
transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and 
unclear terrorisms.  
As earlier stated, these classifications will enhance policy recommendations stemming 
from our analysis. The capital flight data is from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a). The 
matching process yields a panel of 29 African countries for the period 1987-2008
2
, consisting 
of three year non-overlapping intervals. The dependent variable is capital flight, whereas the 
independent variables are dynamics of terrorisms, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear 
and total terrorisms, with the last measurement being the sum of the first-three. The interest 
of using a plethora of terrorism indicators is to avail more room for policy implications. 
Following the empirical literature on capital flight, we apply the direct definition of 
capital flight as defined by Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a, b) as those capital flows between a 
country and the rest of the world, whose measurement begins from the inflows of foreign 
                                                          
2
 The adopted countries include: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
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exchange that are recorded in the country’s Balance of Payments (BoP), in which ‘missing 
money’ – the difference between total capital inflows and recorded foreign exchange 
outflows – is reported as ‘net errors and omissions. This measure has gained credence in 
capital flight literature (e.g.Ndiaye and Siri, 2015; Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015; 
Weeks, 2015)  
It is important to devote some space to discuss the different dimensions of capital 
flight as contained in the empirical literature. It includes the direct ‘hot money’ measure of 
capital flight and the indirect ‘residual’ measure. The direct measure involves the 
computation of capital flight from the official balance of payment (BOP) data. It is the 
outflow of short-term capital from respective countries to abroad in response to the prevailing 
determinants as identified in the literature. It is measured as the summation of the net errors 
and omissions in the BOP and other short term capitals (see Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 
2015). The indirect approach computes capital flight as the difference between the recorded 
inflows and the recorded uses of the foreign exchange. However, for consistency and 
comparison with other authors that have studied capital flight issue in relation to African 
countries (which is our context) we have defined capital flight according to the construction 
by Ndikumana and Boyce (2012). As far as we know, this is the latest data that takes into 
consideration peculiarities regarding the capital flight situation for African countries. 
The control variables include: the lagged variable of capital flight, interest rate, 
external debt, economic growth, Polity IV, corruption-control, trade openness and exchange 
rate. These have been substantially documented in the African capital flight literature (Boyce 
& Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Asongu, 2013a, 2014a, 2015; Weeks, 
2012).  First, past capital flight is expected to increase capital flight. This is known as the 
capital flight trap. Second, from intuition capital flight is expected to be more apparent in 
countries with negative and low real interest rate compared to countries that offer a higher 
real interest rate. A higher interest rate logically implies a higher lending rate by financial 
institutions. Third, external debt fuels capital flight (the revolving door phenomenon). Fourth, 
economic growth may either increase or decrease capital flight depending on whether the 
growth is broad-based or concentrated only in specific sectors of the economy like heavy 
extractive industries. Where growth is broad-based, economic growth may reduce capital 
flight because of a positive outlook on investment opportunities. Conversely, economic 
growth that is concentrated on extractive industries is very likely to be associated with higher 
levels of capital flight (Asongu, 2015). Fifth, constraints in the executive power are very 
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likely to increase capital flight. Sixth, capital flight has been documented to increase with 
poor institutional quality, notably: the absence of corruption-control (Weeks, 2012). The 
expected sign of this governance indicator depends on whether the distribution of corruption-
control is positively or negatively skewed. This is consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2015) who have based their study on bad governance because the governance indicators 
employed were negatively skewed for the most part. Seventh, in accordance with Asongu 
(2013a), trade globalization is a natural determinant of capital flight, especially with practices 
like transfer pricing (Ndikumana & Boyce 2011ab; Asongu, 2015).  Eighth, very high 
deterioration of exchange rate increases capital flight (Asongu, 2014a; Boyce & Ndikumana, 
2003) because it betrays a negative economic outlook. Accordingly, investors prefer 
investment strategies that are less economically ambiguous (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab). The 
definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1 below.  
  
Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
Interest rate  Interest Lending interest rate (%)  
 
 
WDI 
(World Bank) 
   
External debt logextdebt External debt stocks, total (DOD, US$) 
   
Growth  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) 
   
Institutions  Polity IV The extent of institutional constraints on the decision- 
making powers of the chief executive, whether an 
individual or a collective executive.  
    
Capital Flight   capf Logarithm of real capital flight (million, constant USD) Boyce & 
Ndikumana 
(2012a)  
WGI 
(World Bank) 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
 
   
Corruption-control CC “Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests”. 
   
Exchange rate logxrate  Logarithm Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Trade Openness  tradeg Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Domestic terrorism incd Logarithm of Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
inct Logarithm of Number of Transnational terrorism 
incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  incu Logarithm of  Number of terrorism incidents whose 
category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  incdtu Logarithm of Total number of terrorism incidents (inct + 
incu + incu) 
   
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WGI: World Governance Indicators. WDI: World Development Indicators.   
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The summary statistics of the variables is presented in Table 2. Some of the indicators 
are presented in logarithms to enable comparisons in terms of means. We also notice that 
there is a substantial degree variation in the variables, implying that we can be confident that 
significant estimated relationships would emerge. The use of non-overlapping intervals is to 
mitigate instrument proliferation that render Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimates invalid. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
Interest rate 19.194 41.254 0.000 537.70 232 
      
External debt (log) 22.398 1.119 19.785 24.932 228 
      
Growth  3.529 3.808 -10.933 17.339 230 
      
Institutions  5.087 1.485 1.000 7.000 232 
      
Capital Flight (log) 2.843 0.696 -0.221 4.473 171 
      
Corruption-Control  -0.394 0.544 -2.061 1.128 232 
      
Exchange rate (log) 1.341 2.066 -9.607 9.349 232 
      
Trade Openness 62.979 26.764 12.420 155.957 230 
      
Domestic terrorism 5.344 19.135 0.000 153 232 
      
Transnational terrorism 0.892 2.223 0.000 23.333 232 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.022 5.571 0.000 67.666 232 
      
Total terrorism 7.260 24.578 0.000 180.333 232 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
 
Table 3 below presents the summary statistics of the variables. Its purpose is to 
mitigate potential issues of multicollinearity. We observe that such issues are apparent among 
terrorism variables which display relatively higher degrees of substitution. We address these 
issues by using distinct specifications for each terrorism variable.  
Table 3: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size=166) 
             
Control Variables Terrorism Dynamics Dep. Vble  
             
Interest Debt GDPg Polity CC logxrate tradeg incd inct incu incdtu capf  
1.000 -0.095 0.122 -0.044 -0.222 0.127 0.286 -0.054 0.002 -0.007 -0.042 -0.114 Interest  
 1.000 0.017 0.248 -0.149 -0.150 0.038 0.249 0.240 0.189 0.254 0.631 Debt 
  1.000 -0.175 -0.094 0.166 0.123 -0.132 -0.054 -0.023 -0.112 0.104 GDPg 
   1.000 -0.162 -0.171 -0.076 0.142 0.123 0.026 0.129 0.152 Polity 
    1.000 -0.312 -0.213 -0.051 -0.071 -0.041 -0.055     0.046 CC 
     1.000 0.062 -0.086 -0.070 0.002 -0.075 -0.151 logxrate 
      1.000 -0.035 -0.036 -0.074 -0.044 0.098 tradeg 
       1.000 0.670 0.813 0.992 0.223 incd 
        1.000 0.448 0.719 0.213 inct 
         1.000 0.853 0.140 incu 
          1.000 0.223 incdtu 
           1.000 capf 
             
Dep. Vble: Dependent Variable. Interest: lending interest rate. Debt: External debts. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product growth rate. Polity: 
Policy IV. CC: Corruption-Control. Logxrate: Exchange rate. tradeg: trade openness. incd: domestic terrorism. inct: transnational terrorism.  
incu: unclear terrorism. Incdtu: total terrorism. capf: capital flight.   
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3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
The GMM technique is used for three main reasons. First, data is already in non-
overlapping intervals. Hence, given that N(29)>T(8), a GMM technique is a better fit. 
Second, the GMM specification which is dynamic enables us to control for past capital flight 
(capital flight trap) in the specification. Third, there are other traditional advantages 
associated with the use of GMM, namely: (i) the incorporation of both time-series and cross-
sectional variations; (ii) time-invariant omitted variables are controlled for some bite on 
endogeneity and (iii) the System GMM approach eliminates small sample biases in the 
Difference estimator.  
In accordance with recent terrorism (Efobi et al., 2015) and capital flight (Asongu, 
2014a) literature, we adopt a two-step GMM with forward orthogonal deviations instead of 
differencing as an empirical strategy. This technique is an extension of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) by Roodman (2009ab) and has the advantage of accounting for cross-sectional 
dependence and restricting the proliferation of instruments (Love &Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 
2008). 
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarizes the 
estimation procedure.  
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Where: tiCF , is capital flight in country i at period t ; is a constant; represents tau ;  
T , entails terrorism dynamics (domestic, transitional, unclear and total) ;W  is the vector of 
control variables  (corruption-control, trade openness, exchange rate and fuel exports), i is 
the country-specific effect, t is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In the 
specification, we prefer the two-step to the one-step procedure because it is 
heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
3.2.2Quantile Regressions  
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Consistent  with the literature on conditional effects (Asongu et al., 2015), in order to 
investigate if existing levels of capital flight affect the impact of terrorism on capital flight, 
we employ a quintile regression (QR) approach. It consists of assessing the impact of 
terrorism throughout the conditional distributions of capital flight (Keonker & Hallock, 
2001). 
Contrary to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) that is based on the assumption of 
normally distributed error terms, the QR technique is not based on the hypothesis that capital 
flight and error terms are normally distributed. Accordingly, the QR approach enables us to 
investigate the effect of terrorism with particular emphasis on low- medium- and high-
‘capital flight’ countries. The interest of the technique is based on the intuition that blanket 
policies from the terrorism-‘capital flight’ nexus may not be efficient,unless they are 
contingent on initial capital flight levels and tailored differently across low- medium- and 
high-‘capital flight’ countries. In essence, with QR, parameters are estimated at multiple 
points of the conditional distributions of capital flight (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). This 
technique is increasingly being employed in development literature, notably in: finance 
(Asongu, 2014b), corruption (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 
2013b; Efobi et al., 2014) and health (Asongu, 2014c) studies.  
The  th quintile estimator of terrorism is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (3) for ease of 
presentation.   
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Where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum 
of squared residuals, with QR, we minimise the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For 
instance the 10
th
 or 90
th
quintiles (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of capital flight or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                               (4) 
Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This 
formulation is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are 
examined only at the mean of the conditional distribution of capital flight. For the model in 
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Eq. (4), the dependent variable iy  is the capital flight indicator, while ix  contains a constant 
term, corruption-control, trade openness, exchange rate and fuel exports. The specifications 
in Eq. (3) are tailored to avoid the multicollinearity issues between terrorism variables 
identified in Table 3. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
Table 4 and Table 5 present results corresponding to GMM and QR estimations. We 
engage them chronologically.  In the GMM specifications, not all control variables are 
included because of the interest of minimising instrument proliferation. Table 4 is presented 
in four main sets of specifications, notably for: domestic, transnational, unclear and total 
terrorism. Each set of specification entails three main regressions with incremental control 
variables. From Efobi et al. (2015), five main information criteria or post-estimation 
diagnostics are employed to assess the validity of models. First, the null hypothesis of the 
second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR2) in difference shouldnot be 
rejected because its null hypothesis is the position for the absence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals. Second, the null hypothesis of the Sargan and Hansen tests for over-identification 
should also not be rejected because their null hypotheses are the positions that the instruments 
are valid or not correlated with the error terms. It should be noted that while the Sargan over-
identifying restrictions (OIR) test is not robust and not weakened by instruments, the Hansen 
OIR test is robust and weakened by instruments. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) 
for the exogeneity of instruments is further employed to confirm the validity of the Hansen 
OIR results. Fourth, the Fisher test for joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided. 
Its null hypothesis is the position that the joint estimated coefficients are not valid; hence 
should be rejected. Based on highlighted the information criteria: (i) all models are valid at 
the 1% 5% and 10% significance levels;  (ii) five of the twelve models are valid if the 5% 
significance level is incorporated and (iii) two of the twelve models are valid if the 10% 
significance level is considered. Our concern is also about statistical significance, no matter 
how small the magnitude might be.  
We consider all significant levels in establishing the following findings. First, 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase capital flight. 
Second, most of the significant control variables have the expected signs, notably: (i) 
corruption-control that is negatively skewed increases capital flight; (ii) trade globalisation is 
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positive related with capital flight; (iii) external debt increases capital flight and (iv) the 
capital flight trap is confirmed because of the consistent positive significant estimates from 
lagged capital flight.  
 
Table 4: Capital Flight and Terrorism (GMM) 
             
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight (Log) 
             
             
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism Unclear Terrorism  Total Terrorism  
             
Capital Flight (log)(-1) 0.376** 0241*** 0.206** 0.015 0.158*** 0.046 0.350** 0.403*** 0.224* 0.398** 0.371*** 0.205** 
 (0.031) (0.004) (0.049) (0.943) (0.005) (0.636) (0.035) (0.000) (0.053) (0.039) (0.000) (0.047) 
Constant 1.905*** 1.874*** -7.20*** 3.154*** 2.194*** -7.45*** 1.736*** 1.208*** -6.034** 1.639*** 1.528*** -6.033** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.026) (0.004) (0.000) (0.018) 
Domestic Terrorism  0.002** 0.003*** 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.035) (0.000) (0.115)          
Transnational Terrorism  --- --- --- -0.013 0.006 0.011** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.356) (0.506) (0.049)       
Unclear Terrorism   --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.010*** --- --- --- 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Total Terrorism --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002* 0.371*** 0.002** 
          (0.051) (0.000) (0.025) 
Corruption-Control  0.405*** 0.467*** 0.405*** 0.298* 0.376*** 0.271** 0.490*** 0.634*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.537*** 0.393*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.053) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Trade Openness --- 0.002* --- --- 0.001 --- --- 0.006*** --- --- 0.001 --- 
  (0.085)   (0.475)   (0.008)   (0.246)  
Exchange rate(log) --- -0.007 --- --- -0.003 --- --- -
0.013*** 
--- --- -0.008** --- 
  (0.115)   (0.352)   (0.003)   (0.029)  
Interest rate --- 0.001** --- --- 0.0006 --- --- 0.001 --- --- 0.002*** --- 
  (0.044)   (0.471)   (0.145)   (0.007)  
External Debt (log) --- --- 0.408*** --- --- 0.450*** --- --- 0.396*** --- --- 0.357*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
GDP growth rate --- --- -0.0006 --- --- -0.002 --- --- -0.005 --- --- 0.002 
   (0.938)   (0.648)   (0.606)   (0.667) 
Polity IV --- --- 0.027 --- --- -0.014 --- --- -0.032 --- --- 0.022 
   (0.460)   (0.711)   (0.313)   (0.537) 
AR(1) (0.005) (0.020) (0.003) (0.055) (0.011) (0.041) (0.007) (0.008) (0.033) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) 
AR(2) (0.068) (0.121) (0.049) (0.168) (0.151) (0.185) (0.081) (0.067) (0.115) (0.073) (0.089) (0.044) 
Sargan OIR (0.035) (0.135) (0.004) (0.208) (0.382) (0.004) (0.546) (0.427) (0.008) (0.052) (0.137) (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (0.417) (0.302) (0.812) (0.908) (0.444) (0.613) (0.556) (0.576) (0.818) (0.502) (0.331) (0.818) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.309) (0.830) (0.526) (0.339) (0.849) (0.519) (0.533) (0.819) (0.524) (0.291) (0.789) (0.493) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.445) (0.132) (0.815) (0.989) (0.226) (0.567) (0.466) (0.357) (0.825) (0.571) (0.162) (0.841) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.205) (0243) (0.771) (0.921) (0.258) (0.370) (0.254) (0.302) (0.625) (0.220) (0.296) (0.774) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.481) (0.456) (0.616) (0.841) (0.716) (0.813) (0.601) (0.863) (0.831) (0.567) (0.419) (0.624) 
             
Fisher  20.16*** 199.7*** 69.19*** 4.40*** 68.82*** 19753.68
*** 
19.28*** 506.2*** 1926.54*
** 
6.05*** 320.7*** 63.21*** 
Instruments  17 29 29 17 29 29 17 29 29 17 29 29 
Countries  28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Observations  118 118 116 118 118 116 118 118 116 118 118 116 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR (1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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Table 5: Capital Flight and Terrorism (Quantile regression) 
             
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight (log) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
     
 Domestic Terrorism Transnational Terrorism  
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -
6.135*** 
-5.273** -
6.029*** 
-
7.006*** 
-
6.063*** 
-3.914** -
6.171*** 
-4.725** -
6.287*** 
-
7.003*** 
-6.086*** -4.140** 
 (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) 
Domestic Terrorism  0.004** 0.007* 0.003 0.002* 0.001 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.019) (0.093) (0.114) (0.083) (0.501) (0.292)       
Transnational Terrorism  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.022 -0.095** 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.055*** 
       (0.228) (0.010) (0.662) (0.230) (0.521) (0.000) 
Corruption-Control  0.214** 0.372 0.256* 0.154*** 0.041 0.133 0.215** 0.349 0.239 0.157** 0.070 0.195 
 (0.010) (0.245) (0.097) (0.004) (0.594) (0.396) (0.010) (0.148) (0.167) (0.017) (0.396) (0.203) 
Trade Openness 0.003* 0.001 0.0002 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.004 0.0004 0.002** 0.001 0.003* 
 (0.084) (0.858) (0.932) (0.011) (0.232) (0.526) (0.084) (0.504) (0.891) (0.039) (0.226) (0.080) 
Exchange rate(log) -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 -0.008 0.005 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.824) (0.867) (0.714) (0.313) (0.241) (0.720) (0.831) (0.936) (0.612) (0.435) (0.320) (0.928) 
Interest rate -0.001 -0.005 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009* -0.001 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.002 
 (0.422) (0.440) (0.953) (0.651) (0.520) (0.669) (0.391) (0.093) (0.743) (0.721) (0.529) (0.219) 
External Debt (log) 0.387*** 0.350*** 0.387*** 0.419*** 0.394*** 0.333*** 0.388*** 0.303*** 0.401*** 0.419*** 0.396*** 0.331*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth rate 0.021* 0.014 0.015 0.017*** 0.016 0.029* 0.020 0.027 0.011 0.016** 0.018 0.023* 
 (0.088) (0.757) (0.383) (0.009) (0.145) (0.074) (0.107) (0.439) (0.517) (0.045) (0.119) (0.070) 
Polity IV 0.021 -0.066 -0.014 0.060*** 0.039 -0.055 0.021 0.020 -0.015 0.058** 0.037 -0.014 
 (0.503) (0.594) (0.777) (0.003) (0.171) (0.249) (0.493) (0.821) (0.784) (0.018) (0.226) (0.813) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.452 0.188 0.265 0.349 0.359 0.330 0.451 0.181 0.259 0.349 0.358 0.349 
Fisher  27.62***      25.58***      
Observations  166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism  Total Terrorism  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -
6.311*** 
-5.033** -
5.827*** 
-
7.016*** 
-
6.599*** 
-
4.307*** 
-
6.136*** 
-5.689** -
6.072*** 
-
7.017*** 
-6.209*** -3.724** 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) 
Unclear Terrorism   0.008 0.027* 0.012* -0.0004 0.004 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.121) (0.070) (0.062) (0.922) (0.496) (0.793)       
Total Terrorism --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003** 0.005* 0.002* 0.002 0.0007 0.003 
       (0.026) (0.083) (0.097) (0.119) (0.525) (0.114) 
Corruption-Control  0.211** 0.360 0.236 0.158** 0.092 0.125 0.214** 0.409 0.256* 0.156*** 0.051 0.172 
 (0.012) (0.255) (0.113) (0.014) (0.177) (0.297) (0.010) (0.190) (0.072) (0.006) (0.449) (0.285) 
Trade Openness 0.003* 0.001 0.0003 0.002* 0.001 0.003** 0.003* 0.001 0.0002 0.002** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.083) (0.843) (0.902) (0.060) (0.152) (0.029) (0.082) (0.874) (0.930) (0.017) (0.165) (0.451) 
Exchange rate(log) -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 0.005 -0.007 -0.015 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.772) (0.847) (0.531) (0.397) (0.302) (0.355) (0.815) (0.921) (0.621) (0.350) (0.186) (0.938) 
Interest rate -0.001 -0.006 -0.0001 0.00006 -0.0009 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.001 
 (0.405) (0.356) (0.960) (0.568) (0.470) (0.254) (0.413) (0.536) (0.941) (0.664) (0.458) (0.700) 
External Debt (log) 0.395*** 0.338*** 0.377*** 0.421*** 0.417*** 0.347*** 0.387*** 0.372*** 0.389*** 0.420*** 0.401*** 0.317*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth rate 0.020 0.017 0.012 0.016** 0.017* 0.021 0.021* 0.006 0.015 0.017** 0.015 0.029* 
 (0.109) (0.697) (0.430) (0.046) (0.070) (0.116) (0.092) (0.882) (0.347) (0.017) (0.113) (0.078) 
Polity IV 0.023 -0.060 -0.004 0.057** 0.048* -0.045 0.021 -0.074 -0.013 0.059*** 0.042* -0.029 
 (0.448) (0.622) (0.925) (0.019) (0.058) (0.243) (0.491) (0.537) (0.774) (0.005) (0.093) (0.644) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.446 0.177 0.261 0.347 0.356 0.326 0.452 0.185 0.264 0.349 0.358 0.331 
Fisher  27.79***      27.21***      
Observations  166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Capital flight  is least. 
 
Table 5 on QR is presented in two main panels, notably Panel A on domestic and 
transnational terrorisms and Panel B on unclear and total terrorisms. We notice that the OLS 
findings are consistently different from the QR estimations, which justifies the choice of the 
estimation technique. It is interesting to note that the findings of Table 4 are based on mean 
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effects of the dependent variable while those of Table 5 are based on conditional quantiles of 
the dependent variables. The following can be established for Table 5 with 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. First, with the exception of transnational terrorism for which a positive 
effect on capital flight is apparent in the 0.90
th
 quintile, terrorism dynamics affect capital 
flight in low quintiles of the capital flight distribution. In other words, terrorism increases 
capital flight for the most part when initial levels of capital flight are low. Second, most of 
the significant control variables display expected signs.  
 
4.2. Further discussion and policy implications 
We have broadly established that terrorism increases capital flight. This finding is 
consistent with the intuition from the empirical literature in the motivation of this line of 
inquiry. Whereas the effect from terrorism dynamics is consistently significant in GMM 
specifications for the most part, we have found it to be overwhelmingly significant in bottom 
quintiles of the QR specifications. The direct implication is that the effects based on mean 
distributions of capital flight are unlikely to provide complete picture of the relationship 
between terrorism and capital flight.  
 In the light of the above, while it is well known that existing levels of capital flight 
affect future levels of capital flight, there is yet no evidence in the literature that the effect of 
terrorism on capital flight depends on existing levels of capital flight. We have found that 
terrorism would increase capital flight more significantly in countries where existing levels of 
capital flight are low. A possible explanation as to why the effect is not very significant in 
countries where existing capital flight levels are high is that when levels of capital flight are 
already very substantial, the signal of terrorism is no longer significant as a determinant to 
low valuation of investors’ assets and loss of confidence in a positive economic outlook. 
Under this scenario, investors may not evaluate the corresponding terrorists’ attacks as 
significant in increasing the existing level of economic uncertainty. Hence, investors despite 
the high levels of capital flight may still decide not to engage in asset and money outflows as 
a result of terrorism. Some investors could also be motivated by the risk premium to their 
investments resulting from the discussed uncertainty.  
The positive effect of terrorism on capital flight has substantial implications for 
African business and sustainable development, notably: in the need for investment and 
importance of inclusive development in the post-2015 development agenda. Accordingly, 
there is a growing stream of African business literature supporting the need for investment 
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(Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Anyanwu, 2012). 
According to Asiedu et al. (2012), a fundamental factor behind Africa’s underdevelopment is 
the lack of long term investment capital that is essential for sustainable growth. 
Unfortunately, according to the same authors, the continent is characterised by substantial 
capital flight levels despite being capital starved. The April2015 World Bank publication on 
Millennium Development Goals has recently shown that poverty has been decreasing in all 
regions of the world with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2015). In line 
with recent capital flight literature (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b), concerns about 
immiserizing growth and capital flight are most acute in rich countries of the sub-region; a 
position that is consistent with recent quality of growth (QG) literature from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Mlachila et al., 2014, p.27). For example the Republic of Congo and 
Gabon are among Africa’s wealthiest countries with the 15th and 5th ranks and corresponding 
per capita incomes of $1,253 and $4,176. The QG shows deterioration in the positions of 
these countries (partly due to capital flight) between 1990 and 2011. Accordingly, from a 
comparative assessment of 93 developing countries in the periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 
2000-2004 and 2005-2011, the rankings of these countries has deteriorated: the Congo 
Republic (59
th
, 70
th
, 74
th
 and 84
th
)and Gabon (58
th
, 61
st
, 67
th
 and 69
th
). 
While we have also established evidence of a capital flight trap, what is interesting to 
note in relation to the advantage of our dynamic estimation technique is the consistent 
evidence of convergence. Consistent with the capital flight catch-up literature (Asongu, 
2014a), the criterion for evidence of conditional catch-up is when the absolute value of the 
lagged capital flight variable is between zero and one. Evidence of catch-up implies that 
common policies among sampled countries in the fight against capital flight is possible while 
the presence of full catch-up means that the underlying  common policies can be 
implemented without distinction of nationality or locality within sampled countries. The 
harmonization of common policies against capital flight can be enhanced by reducing 
terrorism-related cross-country differences that are inhibiting the convergence process. Some 
documented mechanisms to fighting terrorism have included, inter alia: education (Brockhoff 
et al., 2014), especially in the promotion of bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008); transparency 
(internal and external) (Bell et al., 2014); press freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013); 
military mechanisms (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010); the assessment of behaviours towards 
terrorism (Gardner, 2007) and respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010).  
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In the light of the above on the need for policy harmonization, we suggest some 
measures that can be used to improve efforts towards country-county policy initiatives: 
harmonization of capabilities in regions that are visa-free for citizens of member countries; 
creation of a legal framework and environment for cooperation and financing member states 
of the African Union (AU) in the areas  of transnational and internal security against 
terrorism as well as  better coordination between practitioners and front line actors. 
Speeches of hate can be fought by means of adopting common legislation in the battle 
against xenophobia and racisms. This should be tailored in conjunction with audiovisual 
media services. Radicalisation can be reduced through networks which sensitise citizens on 
the dangerous consequences of terrorism on capital flight, notably, on the potential negative 
consequences on employment, production, macroeconomic stability and economic 
development. Terrorism Financing Tracking Systems (TFTS) can also be introduced to 
control the financing of terrorism.  
Multinational institutions like the African Union (AU) and other regional bodies can 
also play a role. They would need strong commitment from member states. In essence, while 
the management of crises related to terrorism is of national competence, multilateral 
development institutions can also help in the prevention and resolution of crises by 
coordinating common measures in member states. The latest AU Peace and Security Council 
resolution for a joint task force in the fight against the Boko Haram is an eloquent testimony 
of how multinational policy coordination with the support of concerned countries (Cameroon, 
Niger, Chad and Nigeria) can contribute in the fight against terrorism and hence, reduce 
potential capital flight negative externalities associated with the terrorism-induced negative 
economic outlook in the sub-region (Asongu et al., 2016).  
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
Building on previous literature, we set-out to tackle two main issues notably: (i) the 
effect of terrorism on capital flight and (ii) how this effect varies from one terrorism dynamic 
to another. We have investigated the effects of terrorism on capital flight in a panel 29 
African countries for which data is available for the period 1987-2008. The terrorism 
dynamics entail domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. The empirical evidence 
is based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations and 
Quantile regressions (QR). The latter methodology is based on the intuition that blanket 
policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial capital flight levels and 
22 
 
tailored differently across high- and low-‘capital flight’ countries. The following findings 
have been established. First, for GMM, domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms 
consistently increase capital flight. Second, for QR, with the exception of transnational 
terrorism for which a positive effect on capital flight is apparent in the 0.90
th
 quintile, 
terrorism dynamics affect capital flight in low quintiles of the capital flight distribution. In 
other words, terrorism increases capital flight for the most part when initial levels of capital 
flight are low. Second, most of the significant control variables display expected signs. Policy 
implications have been discussed. Further research inquiries devoted to extending the line of 
inquiry can focus on country-specific studies and can consider comparable datasets that 
considers the portfolio component of capital flight. This will be an important addition to the 
literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
References 
Anyanwu, J., (2012). Why Does Foreign Direct Investment Go Where It Goes? New 
Evidence from African Countries, Annals of Economics and Finance, 13(2):425-
462. 
Arellano, M., and Bover, O., (1995), Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation 
of Error Component Model. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1): 29-52. 
Asiedu, E., (2006), Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, 
marketSize, government policy, institutions and political stability. World Economy, 
29(1):63-72. 
Asiedu, E., and Lien, D. (2011). Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural resources. 
Journal of International Economics, 84: 9-111. 
Asiedu, E., Nana, F., and Nti-Addae, A., (2012). “The Paradox of Capital Flight from a 
CapitalStarved Continent”, Department of Economics, University of Kansas, 
Association of Concerned African Scholars, Bulletin No. 87, fall, 2012. 
http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/caploss04-asiedu-
14th.pdf   (Accessed: 10/08/2015). 
Asongu, S. A., (2013a, October), Fighting African capital flight: timelines for the adoption of 
common policies’, The Empirical Economics Letters, 
http://www.eel.my100megs.com/volume-12-number-10.htm  (accessed: 
09/08/2015). 
Asongu, S. A., (2013b), Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels 
matter?” International Journal of Development Issues, 12(1): 36-52. 
Asongu, S. A., (2014b), Financial development dynamic thresholds of financial globalization: 
Evidence from Africa, Journal of Economic Studies, 42(2): 166-195.  
Asongu, S., (2014a), Fighting African Capital Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy 
Harmonization, The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 11 (1): 93-122. 
Asongu, S. A., (2014c), The impact of health worker migration on development dynamics: 
evidence of wealth effects from Africa, The European Journal of Health Economics, 
15(2):187-201. 
Asongu, S. A., (2015), Rational Asymmetric Development, Piketty and the Spirit of Poverty 
in Africa”. African Governance and Development Institute Working Paper No. 
15/006, Yaoundé.  
Asongu, S. A., and Nwachukwu, J. C., (2015), Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab 
Spring, Empirical Economics:  
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-015-1013-0 
Asongu, S., Efobi, U., and Beecroft, I., (2015), FDI, Aid and Terrorism: Conditional 
Threshold Evidence from Developing Countries, African Governance and 
Development Institute Working Paper Series WP/15/019, Yaoundé.  
Asongu, S. A., Tchamyou,  V. S ., and Tchamyou, N. P., (2016). ‘Fighting Terrorism in 
Africa: Benchmarking Policy Harmonization’. In The Comparative African 
Economics of Fighting Terrorism; CODESRIA, Dakar 
Baltagi, B. H., (2008). Forecasting with panel data, Journal of Forecasting, 27(2):153-173.   
Bandyopadhyay, S., and Younas, J., (2014), Terrorism: A Threat to Foreign Direct 
Investment, Doing Business Abroad Policy Report 
Bandyopadhyay, S., Lahiri, S., and Younas, J., (2015), Financing Growth through 
ForeignAid and Private Foreign Loans: Nonlinearities and Complementarities, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 56, 75-96. doi: 
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.04.005. 
24 
 
Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., and Younas, J., (2014), Foreign Direct Investment, Aid, 
andTerrorism,Oxford Economic Papers, 66 (1): 25-50. 
Bartels, F. L., Alladina, S.N., and Lederer, S., (2009). Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-
SaharanAfrica: Motivating Factors and Policy Issues, Journal of African Business, 
10(2): 141-162. 
Bell, S. R., Clay, K. C., Murdie, A., and Piazza, J., (2014). “Opening Yourself Up: The Role 
of External and Internal Transparency in Terrorism Attacks”, Political Research 
Quarterly: doi:10.1177/1065912914527798. 
Bellows, J., and Miguel, E., (2009), War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone, 
Journal of Public Economics, 93: 1144-1157. 
Berrebi, C. and Ostwald, J. (2013), Exploiting the Chaos: Terrorist Target Choice Following 
Natural Disasters, Southern Economic Journal, 79: 793-811. 
Berrebi, C., and Klor, E.F., (2010), The Impact of Terrorism on the Defence Industry, 
Economica, 77(307): 518-543. 
Berrebi, C., and Ostwald, J., (2014a), Terrorism and the Labour Force: Evidence of an Effect 
on Female Labour Force Participation and the Labour Gender Gap, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1-29. doi: 10.1177/0022002714535251 
Berrebi, C., and Ostwald, J., (2014b), Terrorism and Fertility: Evidence for a Causal 
Influence of Terrorism on Fertility, Oxford Economic Papers, 1-21. doi: 
10.1093/oep/gpu042. 
Billger, S. M., and Goel, R. K., (2009), Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling 
corruption? Cross-country quantile regression estimates, Journal of Development 
Economics, 90: 299-305.  
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2011), ‘Capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa: linkages 
with external borrowing and policy options’, International Review of Applied 
Economics, 25(2): 149-170. 
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2012b), Rich Presidents of Poor Nations: Capital Flight 
from Resource-Rich Countries in Africa’, Political Economy Research Institute 
University of Massachusetts. http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/caploss01-ndiku-14th.pdf  (accessed: 09/08/2015). 
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2003), ‘Public Debt and Private Assets: Explaining Capital 
Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries’, World Development, 31(1): 107-130.  
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2012a), ‘Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African 
Countries: Updated Estimate, 1970-2010’, Political Economy Research Institute, 
University of Massachusetts. 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/ADP/SSAfrica_capitalflight_Oct23_2012.
pdf  (accessed: 09/08/2015).  
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana, L. (1998), Congo’s odious debt: External borrowing and 
capital flight in Zaire’, Development and Change, 29: 195-217.  
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana, L. (2001), Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimate of Capital 
Flight from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-1996’, Journal 
of Development,38(2): 27-56. 
Brockhoff, S., Kieger, T., and Meierrieks, D., (2014). “Great Expectations and Hard Times - 
The (Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution: doi: 10.1177/0022002713520589.  
Cho., S-W., (2010). Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?, The Journal of 
ConflictResolution,  54(6): 940-966. 
25 
 
Choi, S-W., and Salehyan , I., (2013). ‘No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, 
Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism’, Conflict Management and Peace Sciences, 30(1): 
53-75.  
Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2002). Greed and grievance incivil war. Working paper series 
2002-01. Centre forthe Study of African Economics. Oxford: OxfordUniversity. 
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Pattillo, C. (2001). Flight capital as a portfolio choice. World 
Bank Economic Review, 15, 55-80. 
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Pattillo, C. (2004), Africa’s Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain 
Drain as Portfolio Decisions. Journal of African Economies, 13 (2): 15-54. 
Costa., A., Hermandez, M., and Sebastian-Gallés, N., (2008). “Bilingualism aids conflict 
resolution: Evidence from the ANT task”, Cognition, 106 (1): 59-86. 
Davies, V. (2008), Post-war Capital Flight and Inflation. Journal of Peace Research, 45 (4), 
519-537. 
Davies, V.A.B., (2010), Capital Flight and Violent Conflict: A Review of the Literature, 
World Development Report 2011 Background Note. 
Enders, W., and  Sandler, T., (2006). The Political Economy of Terrorism. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Efobi, U., Asongu, S., and Beecroft, I., (2015), Foreign Direct Investment, Aid and 
Terrorism: Empirical Insight Conditioned on Corruption Control, African 
Governance and Development Institute Working Paper No. 15/007, Yaoundé. 
Efobi, U., Beecroft, I., and Asongu, S., (2014), Foreign Aid and Corruption: Clarifying 
Murky Empirical Conclusions, African Governance and Development Institute 
Working Paper No. 14/025, Yaoundé.  
Fearon, J.D., and Laitin, D.D., (2011), Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War, World 
Development, 39(2): 199-211. 
Feridun, M., and Shahbaz, M., (2010). Fighting Terrorism: Are Military Measures Effective? 
Empirical Evidence from Turkey, Defence & Peace Economics, 21(2): 193-205.  
Fielding, D., (2004). ‘How does violent conflict affect investment location decisions? 
Evidence from Israel during the intifada’. Journal of Peace Research, (41)4: 465-
484. 
Gaibulloev, K., and Sandler, T., (2011), The Adverse Effect of Transnational and Domestic 
Terrorism on Growth in Africa, Journal of Peace Research, 48(3): 355-371 
Gardner, K. L., (2007). Fighting terrorism the FATF way. Global Governance: A Review of 
Multilateralism and International Organisation, 13(3): 325-345. 
Henry, J. S. (2012). The Price of Offshore Revisited. London: Tax Justice Network. 
Hermes, N. and Lensink. R., (2001). ‘Capital flight and the uncertainty of government 
policies’. Economics Letters, 71(3): 377-81. 
Hoffman, A. M., Shelton, C., and Cleven, E., (2013). “Press freedom, publicity, and the 
cross-national incidence of transnational terrorism”, Political Research Quarterly, 
66 (4): 896-909.  
Koenker, R., and Hallock, F.K., (2001), Quantile regression, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15:143-156. 
Le, Q.V. and Zak. P. J., (2006). ‘Political risk and capital flight’. Journal of International 
Money and Finance. (25)2: 308-29. 
Le Roux, S., and Kelsey, D., (2015a), Dragon slaying with ambiguity: theory and 
experiments”, Sara le Roux, Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University. 
Le Roux, S., and Kelsey, D., (2015b), Strategic substitutes, complements and ambiguity: An 
experimental study, department of economics, Oxford Brookes University.  
26 
 
Lensink, R., Hermes, N., and V. Murinde. V., (2000). ‘Capital flight and political risk’. 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 19(1), 73-92. 
Love, I., and Zicchino, L., (2006), Financial development and dynamic investment behaviour: 
Evidence from Panel VAR. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46(2): 
190-210.  
Mlachila, M., Tapsoba, R., and Tapsoba, S. J. A., (2014). A quality of growth index for 
developing countries: A proposal, IMF Working Paper No. 14/172. 
Napps, C., and Enders, W., (2015), A regional investigation of the interrelationships between 
domestic and transnational terrorism: A time series analysis, Defence and Peace 
Economics, 26 (2): 133-151.  
Ndiaye, A.S., and Siri, A., (2015), Impact of Capital Flight on Domestic Resource 
Mobilization in Burkina Faso, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) 
Collaborative Workshop Project on Capital Flight and Tax Havens, Final Reports 
Review Workshop, Tanzania, May 29-30, 2015. 
Ndikumana, L. and Boyce, J. K. (2011a), Africa’s odious debts: How foreign loans and 
capital flight bled a continent. London: Zed Books. 
Ndikumana, L. and Boyce, J. K.  (2011b) ‘New estimates of capital flight from sub-Saharan 
African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options’. 
International Review of Applied Economics, 25(2): 149-170. 
Ndikumana, L., Boyce, J.  and Ndiaye,A.S. (2015) "Capital Flight: Measurement and 
Drivers", in Ajayi, S. I. and L. Ndikumana (Eds), Capital Flight from Africa: 
Causes, Effects, and Policy Issues, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 15-54. 
Nyatepe-Coo, A.A. (1994). ‘Capital flight in low-income sub-Saharan Africa: The effects of 
political climate and macroeconomic policies’. Scandinavian Journal of 
Development Alternatives, 13(4): 59-69. 
Okada, K., and Samreth, S., (2012), The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile 
regression approach, Economic Letters, 115(2): 240-243.  
Piazza, J. A., (2006), Rooted in poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social 
Cleavages, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(1): 159-177. 
Rolfe, R. J., and Woodward, D. P., (2004). Attracting foreign investment through 
privatization: the Zambian experience, Journal of African Business, 5(1): 5-27. 
Roodman, D., (2009a), A note on the theme of too many instruments, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 71(1):135-158.  
Roodman, D., (2009b), How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM 
in Stata, Stata Journal, 9(1): 86-136. 
Sandler, T. and Enders, W. (2008) Economic consequences of terrorism in developed 
anddeveloping countries: an overview, in P. Keefer and N. Loayza (Eds.) Terrorism, 
EconomicDevelopment and Political Openness, Cambridge University Press, New 
York. 
Sharma, K., (2006), The political economy of civil war in Nepal, World Development, 34(7): 
1237-1253. 
Weeks, J., (2012), Macroeconomic impact of capital flows in Sub-Saharan African countries, 
1980-2008, Association of Concerned Africa Scholar Bulletin, 87, 1-7. 
Weeks, J., (2015), Macroeconomic impact of capital flows in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Ajayi, 
S.I., and Ndikumana, L., (Eds.), Capital Flight from Africa: Causes,Effects and 
Policy Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
World Bank (2015), World Development Indicators, World Bank Publications 
http://www.gopa.de/fr/news/world-bank-release-world-development-indicators-2015  
(Accessed: 25/04/2015).  
